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| 09/851,029 | 05/07/2001 | Frank Addante | 16113-001001 | 2494 |
| 26192 7590 01/29/2009 FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. PO BOX 1022 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022 | | 9 | EXAMINER NGUYEN, TRI V | IINER |
| | | | | N, TRI V |
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| 1 | UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE |
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| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS |
| 5 | AND INTERFERENCES |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 8 | Ex parte FRANK ADDANTE |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | Appeal 2008-4617 |
| 12 | Application 09/851,029 |
| 13 | Technology Center 1700 |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 | Decided: January 28, 2009 |
| 17 | |
| 18 | Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, HUBERT C. LORIN, and ANTON W. |
| 19 20 | FETTING, Administrative Patent Judges. |
| 20 | TETTING, Administrative Talent Juages. |
| 21 22 | FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. |
| 23 | 1 L 1 III (G, Naministrative 1 dieni Juage. |
| 23 24 | |
| 2 5 | DECISION ON APPEAL |
| 26 | BECKETOT (OT (THI TELLE |
| 27 | STATEMENT OF THE CASE |
| 28 | Frank Addante (Appellant) seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a |
| 29 | Final Rejection of claims 1-88, the only claims pending in the application on |
| 30 | appeal. |
| 31 | We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) |
| 32 | (2002). |
| J 2 | 140041. |

| 1 | We AFFIRM- | IN-PART. | |
|----------|------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 2 | The Appellant | invented a way of digital | advertising via computer |
| 3 | networks, for monito | oring and recording transac | ctions of a user who is |
| 4 | redirected to a transa | action site after selecting a | n advertisement (Specification |
| 5 | 1:14-18). | | |
| 6 | An understand | ling of the invention can b | be derived from a reading of |
| 7 | exemplary claim 1, v | which is reproduced below | [bracketed matter and some |
| 8 | paragraphing added] | | |
| 9 | 1. A computer | network comprising: | |
| 10 | [1] a user node | e to provide a request to pe | erform a transaction and |
| 11 | - | cord the transaction; | |
| 12 | | on node to receive the requ | |
| 13 | | perform the transaction in | |
| 14 | - | saction confirmation to the | • |
| 15 | | nfirmation including a cor | nmand to record the |
| 16 | transaction; ar | node to receive the reques | t to record the |
| 17 18 | | ovided by the user node in | |
| 19 | - | ecord the transaction, and | - |
| 20 | | response to the request to | |
| 21 | duisaction in | response to the request to | record the transaction. |
| 22 | This appeal ar | ises from the Examiner's | Final Rejection, mailed May |
| 23 | 30, 2006. The Appe | llant filed an Appeal Brief | f in support of the appeal on |
| 24 | July 2, 2007. An Ex | aminer's Answer to the A | ppeal Brief was mailed on |
| 25 | October 18, 2007. A | Reply Brief was filed on | December 14, 2007. |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | | PRIOR ART | |
| 28 | The Examiner | relies upon the following | prior art: |
| 29 | Davis | US 5,796,952 | Aug. 18, 1998 |
| 30 | Messer | WO 98/57285 | Dec. 17, 1998 |
| 31 | Angles | US 5,933,811 | Aug. 3, 1999 |

| 1 | REJECTIONS |
|----|---|
| 2 | Claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, 64-78, 80-83, and 85-87 |
| 3 | stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Messer. |
| 4 | Claims 13, 15, 17, 31, 32, 53, 54, 63, 79, and 84 stand rejected under |
| 5 | 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer and Angles. |
| 6 | Claim 88 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable |
| 7 | over Messer and Davis. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | ISSUES |
| 10 | The issues pertinent to this appeal are |
| 11 | • Whether the Appellant has sustained its burden of showing that the |
| 12 | Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, |
| 13 | 64-78, 80-83, and 85-87 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by |
| 14 | Messer. |
| 15 | • Whether the Appellant has sustained its burden of showing that the |
| 16 | Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13, 15, 17, 31, 32, 53, 54, 63, 79, |
| 17 | and 84 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer and |
| 18 | Angles. |
| 19 | • Whether the Appellant has sustained its burden of showing that the |
| 20 | Examiner erred in rejecting claim 88 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as |
| 21 | unpatentable over Messer and Davis. |
| 22 | The pertinent issue turns on whether Messer describes a user node that |
| 23 | provides a request to record the transaction and a monitor node to record the |
| 24 | transaction in response to the request to record the transaction. |
| 25 | |

FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES 1 The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to 2 be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Messer 4 Messer is directed to a referral tracking and control system for 01. 5 promoting goods and services on a wide area, public/private 6 access network, such as the Internet (Messer 1:5-7). 7 Messer describes transactions that occur between a Site Owner 02. 8 server and Merchant server via a Clearinghouse server (Messer 9 7:6-25). 10 Messer's Clearinghouse server is programmed to communicate 03. 11 with the Merchants and Site Owner to facilitate the tracking and 12 accounting associated with the successful Merchant based 13 transactions (Messer 7:25-28). 14 In operation, when Messer's USER selects a banner ad, the site 15 04. program inputs onto the USER command line the address for the 16 Clearinghouse. Accordingly, USER access is directed to the 17 Clearinghouse server, wherein the Clearinghouse server first 18 stores several pieces of information, such as a site (ID), banner 19 (ID), and USER (X). Immediately thereafter the Clearinghouse 20 server places onto the USER command line, the address for the 21 Merchant (HT'I'P) directing USER control to the Merchant's web 22 page. Information about the product described in the banner ad is 23 now displayed to the USER including the procedure for 24 purchasing the product (Messer 13: 24-36). 25

| 1 | 05. Messer's USER has the option of purchasing the product |
|----|---|
| 2 | advertised in the banner ad. If the USER does not make a |
| 3 | purchase, a cookie is placed on the USER by the Merchant server. |
| 4 | This cookie is tracked by the Merchant server if a subsequent |
| 5 | purchase is made. If the USER makes the purchase, information |
| 6 | relating to the purchase and the USER are transferred back to the |
| 7 | Clearinghouse server. Sales particulars including all co- |
| 8 | promotion and commission payment are then calculated at the |
| 9 | Clearinghouse server. After information is received about the |
| 10 | purchase at the Clearinghouse server, a commission determination |
| 11 | is calculated. Once these terms have been implemented, final |
| 12 | accounting for the Merchant and Site Owner is implemented on |
| 13 | the Clearinghouse server, including payment of commission and |
| 14 | recording all transaction details. In this way, valuable records |
| 15 | detailing the activity of select banners in terms of revenue are |
| 16 | created on the Clearinghouse server (Messer 14:1-20). |
| 17 | Angles |
| 18 | 06. Angles is directed to delivering customized advertisements |
| 19 | within interactive communications systems (Angeles 1:9-12). |
| 20 | Davis |
| 21 | 07. Davis is directed to monitoring client use of and interaction |
| 22 | with a resource downloaded from a server on a computer network, |
| 23 | storing monitored data, creating a database including profiles |
| 24 | indexed by user and/or resource identity, and generating |
| 25 | customized resources based upon client profiles (Davis 1:8-13). |
| 26 | Facts Related To The Level Of Skill In The Art |

| 1 | 08. Neither the Examiner nor the Appellant has addressed the level |
|----|--|
| 2 | of ordinary skill in the pertinent arts of systems analysis and |
| 3 | programming, ecommerce transaction systems, and we will |
| 4 | therefore consider the cited prior art as representative of the level |
| 5 | of ordinary skill in the art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d |
| 6 | 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he absence of specific findings |
| 7 | on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error |
| 8 | 'where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need |
| 9 | for testimony is not shown") (quoting Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. |
| 10 | Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985). |
| 11 | Facts Related To Secondary Considerations |
| 12 | 09. There is no evidence on record of secondary considerations of |
| 13 | non-obviousness for our consideration. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | PRINCIPLES OF LAW |
| 16 | Claim Construction |
| 17 | During examination of a patent application, pending claims are |
| 18 | given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the |
| 19 | specification. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969); In |
| 20 | re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). |
| 21 | Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim |
| 22 | are not read into the claim. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d |
| 23 | 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted "in view of the |
| 24 | specification" without importing limitations from the specification into the |
| 25 | claims unnecessarily) |

Although a patent applicant is entitled to be his or her own 1 lexicographer of patent claim terms, in ex parte prosecution it must be 2 within limits. In re Corr, 347 F.2d 578, 580 (CCPA 1965). The applicant 3 must do so by placing such definitions in the specification with sufficient 4 clarity to provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with clear and precise 5 notice of the meaning that is to be construed. See also In re Paulsen, 30 6 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (although an inventor is free to define the 7 specific terms used to describe the invention, this must be done with 8 reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision; where an inventor chooses 9 to give terms uncommon meanings, the inventor must set out any 10 uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure so as to 11 give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change). 12 Anticipation 13 "A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in 14 the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior 15 art reference." Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 16 (Fed. Cir. 1987). "When a claim covers several structures or compositions, 17 either generically or as alternatives, the claim is deemed anticipated if any of 18 the structures or compositions within the scope of the claim is known in the 19 prior art." Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). "The 20 identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the 21 ... claim." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 22 1989). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is 23 not an *ipsissimis verbis* test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In 24 re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 25 **Obviousness** 26

A claimed invention is unpatentable if the differences between it and 1 the prior art are "such that the subject matter as a whole would have been 2 obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill 3 in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. 4 Ct. 1727, 1729-30 (2007); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13-14 5 (1966).6 In *Graham*, the Court held that the obviousness analysis is bottomed 7 on several basic factual inquiries: "[(1)] the scope and content of the prior art 8 are to be determined; [(2)] differences between the prior art and the claims at 9 issue are to be ascertained; and [(3)] the level of ordinary skill in the 10 pertinent art resolved." 383 U.S. at 17. See also KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734. 11 "The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely 12 to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." Id. at 13 1739. 14 "When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives 15 and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field 16 or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable 17 variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability." *Id.* at 1740. 18 "For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one 19 device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would 20 improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious 21 unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill." *Id.* 22 "Under the correct analysis, any need or problem known in the field 23 of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide 24 a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed." *Id.* at 1742. 25

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| 1 | ANALYSIS |
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| 2 | Claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, 64-78, 80-83, and 85-87 rejected |
| 3 | under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Messer. |
| 4 | The Appellant argues these claims in two groups, viz., a group |
| 5 | consisting of claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, and 64-77 and a |
| 6 | second group consisting of claims 78, 80-83, and 85-87. Accordingly, we |
| 7 | select claims 1 and 78 as representative of the groups. |
| 8 | 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2007). |
| 9 | The Examiner found that Messer anticipated claim 1 (Answer 3). |
| 10 | The Appellant contends that Messer does not describe a request from |
| 11 | a user node to record the transaction, or a transaction confirmation including |
| 12 | a command to record the transaction as required by the claims (Br. 5: First |
| 13 | full ¶). The Appellant contends that when Messer's user makes a purchase, |
| 14 | the merchant site can track the purchase, and a clearinghouse server can |
| 15 | calculate various data (Br. 5: Second full ¶), but there is no suggestion that |
| 16 | any information is recorded based on a specific request from a user node to |
| 17 | record the transaction as required by the claims (Br. 9:Third ¶, beginning |
| 18 | "However"). |
| 19 | We disagree with the Appellant. |
| 20 | Initially we map Messer's structure to the claim. Messer's Site Owner |
| 21 | server corresponds to the claimed user node. Messer's Merchant server |
| 22 | corresponds to the claimed transaction node. Messer's Clearinghouse server |
| 23 | corresponds to the claimed monitor node (FF 03). |
| 24 | Next we describe Messer's transaction flow. Messer's transaction |
| 25 | begins when a user selects a banner ad, which passes a message to Messer's |
| 26 | Clearinghouse server, which then passes a message to Messer's Merchant |

server (FF 04). If a user purchases the product in a banner ad, a message 1 passes back to Messer's Clearinghouse server with purchase information, 2 where transaction details are recorded (FF 05). Thus, the Clearinghouse 3 server stores information only after the Site Owner server and Merchant 4 server both pass messages to the Clearinghouse server. 5 Messer's Site Owner, corresponding to the claimed user node, thus 6 provides a request to perform a transaction. The transaction requested is that 7 of the entire process flow described by Messer. Messer's Merchant server, 8 the transaction node, receives the request to perform the transaction, 9 performs the transaction in response, and provides a transaction 10 confirmation to the user node via the Clearinghouse server. This message 11 passed from the Merchant to the Clearinghouse includes a command to 12 record the transaction. Messer's Clearinghouse server, the monitor node, 13 receives the request to record the transaction and records the transaction. 14 The issues are then whether Messer's Site Owner server provides a 15 request to perform a transaction and a request to record a transaction; 16 whether Messer's Clearinghouse server receipt of the request to record the 17 transaction provided by the user node is in response to the command to 18 record the transaction; and whether Messer's Clearinghouse server records 19 the transaction in response to the request to record the transaction. 20 Clearly the selection of Messer's ad banner is a request to perform the 21 transaction that the ad banner is designed to promote. At the time of ad 22 banner selection, it is as yet unknown whether there will be a transaction to 23 record. But when a transaction is executed at the Merchant server, it is as a 24 result of the messages passed from the Site Owner and Clearinghouse 25 servers. Thus, when the Merchant site passes a message to the 26

Clearinghouse server to record a transaction, that message is the result of the 1 original selection of a banner ad from the Site Owner server. 2 Limitation [1] of claim 1 requires that this request to record a 3 transaction be provided by the user node. There is no further limitation on 4 the mechanism of such provision. Limitation [1] does not require, in 5 particular, that the message that ultimately contains the request be itself 6 generated by the user node. It is sufficient for the act of providing that the 7 message causally result from some structure of or activity by the user node. 8 Because the message to record the transaction results from the selection of 9 the banner ad leading to the purchase, this message is provided by the 10 actions on the user node and therefore is provided by the user node. 11 Alternatively, a message to record the transaction is implicitly 12 contained within the transaction requesting the transaction by operation of 13 Messer's process flow. The fact the message to record as a separate entity is 14 instantiated on a different server does not negate the original implicit 15 message to record within the message to perform at the time of the ad 16 selection by virtue of the operation of Messer's system. 17 As to the second issue, Messer's Clearinghouse server's receipt of the 18 request to record the transaction is in response to the messages from the Site 19 Owner server to Clearinghouse server, Clearinghouse server to Merchant 20 server, and Merchant server back to Clearinghouse server, and is thus in 21 response to the command to record the transaction provided by the banner ad 22 selection as discussed *supra*. 23 As to the third issue, Messer's Clearinghouse server receives the 24 transaction in response to the command now coming from the Merchant 25 server to record the transaction, and records the transaction. This 26

recordation is in response to the original triggering of the transaction, viz., 1 selection of the ad banner, because the entire process flow is in response to 2 that trigger. 3 The Appellant has not sustained its burden of showing that the 4 Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, and 5 64-77 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Messer. 6 As to independent claim 78, this claim requires formatting a cookie at 7 an ad server; storing a cookie at a user node of a user who made the 8 selection; and providing the cookie from the user node to the ad server 9 whenever the user makes a transaction at a sale site associated with the 10 advertisement. The Examiner found that Messer anticipated claim 78 11 (Answer 12-13). The Appellant argues that Messer does not refer to an ad 12 server and that the only server that formats a cookie in Messer, the Merchant 13 server, is not an ad server. 14 We agree with the Appellant. The Examiner cites Messer 13:24-14:8 15 for support. The Examiner further construed Messer's content site to be an 16 ad server and found that the cookie was edited at several sites. We find that 17 the only description of editing a cookie at a specified server in Messer 18 occurs at the Merchant server (FF 05). The Examiner cites no specific 19 portion of Messer to support the finding that a cookie is edited at several 20 sites, and the portion the Examiner cited for general support refers only to 21 operations on the Merchant server. We find no portion of Messer to 22 describe editing at other than the Merchant server. An ad server is simply a 23 server for the administration of advertising. In Messer, this is performed by 24 its Clearinghouse server (FF 04 & 05). There is nothing in Messer that 25

suggests its Merchant server is an ad server.

26

| 1 | The Appellant has sustained its burden of showing that the Examiner |
|----|--|
| 2 | erred in rejecting claims 78, 80-83, and 85-87 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as |
| 3 | anticipated by Messer. |
| 4 | |
| 5 | Claims 13, 15, 17, 31, 32, 53, 54, 63, 79, and 84 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § |
| 6 | 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer and Angles. |
| 7 | The Appellant relies on the arguments in support of claim 1, which we |
| 8 | found unpersuasive <i>supra</i> , and claim 78, which we found persuasive. The |
| 9 | Appellant has therefore not sustained its burden of showing that the |
| 10 | Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13, 15, 17, 31, 32, 53, 54, and 63, but has |
| 11 | sustained its burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims |
| 12 | 79 and 84, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer and |
| 13 | Angles. |
| 14 | |
| 15 | Claim 88 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer |
| 16 | and Davis. |
| 17 | The Appellant relies on the arguments in support of claim 78, which |
| 18 | we found persuasive supra. The Appellant has therefore sustained its |
| 19 | burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 88 under 35 |
| 20 | U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer and Davis. |
| 21 | |
| 22 | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW |
| 23 | The Appellant has not sustained its burden of showing that the |
| 24 | Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, and |
| 25 | 64-77 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Messer. The Appellant |
| 26 | has sustained its burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting |

| 1 | claims 78, 80-83, and 85-87 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by |
|----------|---|
| 2 | Messer. |
| 3 | The Appellant has not sustained its burden of showing that the |
| 4 | Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13, 15, 17, 31, 32, 53, 54, and 63 under |
| 5 | 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the prior art. The Appellant has |
| 6 | sustained its burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims |
| 7 | 79, 84, and 88 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the prior art. |
| 8 | |
| 9 | DECISION |
| 10 | To summarize, our decision is as follows: |
| 11 | • The rejection of claims 1-12, 14, 16, 18-30, 33-52, 55-62, and 64-77 |
| 12 | under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Messer is sustained. |
| 13 | • The rejection of claims 78, 80-83, and 85-87 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) |
| 14 | as anticipated by Messer is not sustained. |
| 15 | • The rejection of claims 13, 15, 17, 31, 32, 53, 54, and 63 under 35 |
| 16 | U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Messer and Angles is sustained. |
| 17 | • The rejection of claims 79 and 84 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as |
| 18 | unpatentable over Messer and Angles is not sustained. |
| 19 | • The rejection of claim 88 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable |
| 20 | over Messer and Davis is not sustained. |
| 21 | No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with |
| 22 | this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2007). |
| 23 | |
| 24 | AFFIRMED-IN-PART |
| 25 | |
| 26 27 | |
| 24 25 | AFFIRMED-IN-PART |

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